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This paper develops a model based on the agency theory to analyse road management systems 
that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment for the contractor. 
The base assumption is the asymmetric information between a principal (Public Authorities) and 
an agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of the latter. It is assumed that the principal may only 
measure the agent’s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that 
may be verified by the authorities. In this model it is assumed there is a relation between the 
efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, 
although there may be dispersions between both variables that give rise to a certain degree of 
randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal mechanism was made on the basis of this 
model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment 
and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis, the incentive 
mechanism should include a fixed component and a payment according to the obtained 
performance level. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of 
public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the 
system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should avoid those 
indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous countries have developed diverse road management systems over recent decades that 
have gradually replaced direct management by local and central government. The majority of 
these formulas are based on a contract that establishes the relation between the authorities and a 
company entrusted with certain aspects of road management. The scope of the services rendered 
by the contractor varies and may include the maintenance of the asset, traffic and road 
management and, in some cases, the funding and construction of a new road infrastructure and 
its ensuing management on completion. The contract formulas used may also vary from standard 
maintenance contracts to integral management contracts, concessions or other types of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
It is becoming more common to base these different contract formulas on a payment to the agent 
that is associated with the obtained quality level, which is, in turn, measured by a series of 
indicators that have become increasingly well defined over recent years (Delgado Quiralte et al., 
2007; Harding et al., 2010; Federal Highway Administration, 2011). This approach acts as an 
incentive system to ensure the correct performance of the contractor and the optimization of 
resources employed in road maintenance and operation. 
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Contract formulas of this nature may be analysed within the general framework of agency 
theory, which has undergone considerable development since it was first established back in the 
1970’s. This theory is an attempt to explain the agency relationship whereby one party (the 
principal) delegates certain tasks to another party (the agent), and where this relation is regulated 
by a contract or by similar means (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory has been applied to 
many different fields of activity ever since its origins (Harris and Raviv, 1978). Among the first 
authors to study the relationship between a public authority and an agent, were Loeb and Magat 
(1979) and Baron and Myerson (1982), who focused on the problem of the regulation of a natural 
monopoly under conditions of asymmetric information between the authorities (principal) and 
the company providing the asset or service (agent). Laffont and Tirole (1993) worked on 
systematizing this area of economic analysis, and Iossa and Martimort (2009), Mu et al. (2010) and 
González-Díaz and Montoro-Sánchez (2011), specialized in the field of transport. In this paper we 
contribute to these earlier studies by being the first to apply the agency approach to the design of 
a system of quality indicators in road management. As indicated above, the use of this type of 
indicators has had a boost in recent years, and there is some expertise in the definition and 
calibration of these systems. In section 4 of this paper, are included some examples of indicators 
that have been used in road concession contracts. However, there is no systematic study of the 
principles that should be taken into account to design an efficient set of quality indicators, and in 
this paper we aim to contribute a theoretical model that can be applied to the road sector. For 
example, one problem that can be found in many road contracts is the excess in the number of 
quality indicators used to control the activity of the contractor. This paper shows that, under 
certain circumstances, the use of redundant indicators may, in fact, reduce the overall efficiency.       
The agency problem arises under conditions of asymmetric information between the principal 
and the agent when there is a conflict of interest and where it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). In these cases, the research 
conducted on the principal-agent relationship was based on the specifications of a series of 
assumptions regarding the possible means by which the principal may provide incentives to the 
agent to bring their respective objectives into line. On the basis of these assumptions and by a 
method of deduction, it was then possible to find a solution to the problem of contract 
optimization. One of the main aspects of the agency relationship is the attitude towards risk of 
the contracting parties. In agency theory, it is generally assumed that the agent is risk-averse and 
the principal is risk-neutral or, at the very least, that the agent is more averse to risk (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Sadka, 2007). 
In the present work, we developed a model based on the assumption that the agent (contractor) 
will normally be averse to risk, although we have also examined the implications in the case that 
the agent is risk neutral. The incentive provided by a payment system based on performance 
levels is restricted in the model due to the randomness of the contract. This randomness is due to 
the fact that the authorities cannot directly measure the effort made by the contractor to render 
the service and may only do so by means of specific performance indicators that may be observed 
and verified by the authorities. This may well give rise to certain discrepancies between the 
efforts made by the contractor and the effective results obtained from the performance indicators 
and which, in turn, affects the payment received by the contractor. A good example is the case of 
road accident and fatality indices that are employed in many PPP contracts. The results obtained 
from these indicators effectively depend on numerous random factors and only to a certain 
degree on the performance of the contractor. 
The problem of information asymmetry as described in the previous paragraph leads to a case of 
moral hazard (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The main idea is that the application of contract incentives 
to the agent conflicts with their risk aversion and leads to a duality of objectives by, 1) paying the 
productive work of the agent and, 2) efficiently assigning the risks, and thereby preventing the 
optimal outcome obtained in an environment of complete information (Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991). In this context, an important issue is the so-called informativeness principle. This principle 
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was first formulated by Blackwell (1953), and has been developed within contract theory by 
Holmström (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983), among others. According to 
this principle, a contract should maximize the precision of performance indicators used to 
evaluate the agent. In turn, the maximization of precision would imply incorporating all the 
informative signals on the agent´s performance and filter out irrelevant noise (Chaigneau et al., 
2014). As will be seen, the results of this paper are, to a large extent, based on this principle. 
More recently, the agency theory approach has been adopted by Dewatripont and Legos (2005), 
Martimort and Pouyet (2008) and Iossa and Martimort (2012, 2015), who fundamentally geared 
their studies towards the comparative analysis of public-private partnerships with respect to 
more traditional public procurement. These authors consider a PPP to be basically defined by the 
bundling of diverse tasks within one single contract between the public authorities and the agent: 
and particularly, the design and construction of a certain infrastructure together with its 
maintenance and the operation of the corresponding service once the infrastructure is up and 
running. Under traditional procurement methods, these milestones are separated and assigned to 
different agents. The most relevant conclusion reached by the above authors is that, under certain 
circumstances, PPP contracts may be more efficient than traditional public procurement since the 
efforts of the agent during the construction stage are positively reflected in the agent’s results 
during the operation stage. As such, it is necessary to design a suitable system of incentives that 
allow the agent to internalise the benefits derived from the greater build quality of the 
infrastructure. In an optimal situation this would then lead to the greater allocation of risks to the 
agent under a PPP than under a traditional contract. 
Unlike these previous studies, the model considered in the present work is applicable to both a 
PPP and to any other type of road management contract where the contractor’s remuneration is 
based on the quality level obtained. The incentive system to the contractor should, at the outset, 
combine payment based on performance levels and payment in accordance with the number of 
users, as indicated by Sánchez Soliño (2012). However, there has been a shift in attitude in recent 
years in favour of the retention of the demand risk by the authorities (Abdel Aziz, 2007). This 
tendency has been very marked in the United Kingdom, where contracts since the early part of 
the 2000s carried out under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) framework were based on 
performance-based payment systems (Standard & Poor’s, 2003). This method has become even 
more widespread following the 2008 financial collapse which led to the reluctance of the majority 
of financial corporations to fund any project of this nature that incorporates a substantial transfer 
of the demand risk to the agent. In this paper, we shall therefore assume a contract where no 
demand risk is transferred to the contractor. 
The following section includes a description of the model employed and the base assumptions of 
the incentive system to the contractor. The object of the analysis was to optimize the parameters 
defining the payment system to the contractor from the perspective of welfare. These parameters 
depend on a series of factors and the influence of each of these is the subject of detailed study. In 
section 3 we analyse the implications of correlation between different performance indicators. 
Section 4 includes an empirical study of the criteria applied in the design of the performance 
indicator system in a wide range of road concessions in Spain and compare these to the efficiency 
criteria analysed earlier in the model proposed in this work. Finally, the conclusions contain a 
summary of the main results and a series of recommendations to be taken into account in the 
design of the contracts.  
2. Formulation of the model 
We shall presume that a certain authority (the principal) is responsible for the management of a 
certain road and decides to delegate the corresponding functions by way of a contract with a 
specific company (agent). In most cases, these functions will include the maintenance of the road 
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.465-481  468 
Sánchez Soliño 
Optimizing performance-based mechanisms in road management: an agency theory approach 
 
infrastructure and the corresponding installations, the necessary services for correct traffic 
operation and, when applicable, the necessary investment to extend or improve the 
infrastructure. 
In the model developed below, the road is taken to be free for users though the model may 
readily be applied to the case of toll roads. The objective function of the principal is that of social 
welfare and one the public authority will attempt to maximize through the optimization of the 
parameters defining the remuneration mechanism of the contract, as described further on. 
Therefore, we assume that the public authority behaves as a benevolent regulator, and leaving 
aside any self-interest of the principal, an assumption that is commonly used in public regulation 
literature (see, for example, Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
The social benefits obtained from the operation of the road, including the surplus of users, 
depend on the quality levels offered and which, in turn, can be measured by a series of 
indicators, taken to be independent from each other. In order to simplify the statement, we shall 
presume that the social benefits rise linearly with quality, in accordance with the following 
equation: 
∑
=
+=
n
i
iio qaSS
1
                                                      (1)                                                                                              
Where S is the total social benefit, ai are constants greater than zero and qi represent the levels 
obtained in a series of n road quality dimensions. These quality levels depend to a certain extent 
on the efforts made by the contractor, as we shall see below. S0 represents the minimum social 
benefit obtained at a quality level that we shall conventionally establish at zero in each 
dimension. This reflects the fact that public authorities generally demand certain minimum 
conditions before allowing the public to use the road. 
As indicated, the quality levels qi may be related to the efforts (referred to as ei) made by the 
agent to improve service performance in each of the quality dimensions. An essential element of 
our model is that this relation between the quality obtained and the efforts made by the 
contractor presents a statistical noise, or random component, to the extent that: 
iii eq e+=                                                                                                                              (2)                         
This formulation can be found, for example, in Martimort and Pouyet (2008). Each variable εi 
represents this random component which is taken to have a normal distribution, with a mean 
equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to σi. This means that the public authority cannot 
directly observe the efforts made by the agent and may only estimate this indirectly by the values 
obtained for the quality indicators employed. However, these values do not only depend on the 
effort ei, but also on other unpredictable factors that are grouped in the said random variables. 
As such, in our model the agent acts under risk conditions due to the randomness of the variables 
qi and it is similarly assumed that the agent is not neutral to these risks. This thinking follows the 
general assumptions adopted in agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Regarding the authorities, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that risk is sufficiently diversified on account of the large 
number of projects and services for which they are responsible, and which subsequently makes 
them risk neutral.  
The agent performs the road management duties and subsequently incurs certain costs that may 
be expressed as follows: 
∑
=
+=
n
i
ii eCC
1
0 )(ψ                                                                                                                       (3) 
Where C represents the cost of producing the services rendered by the agent and C0 is a fixed cost 
term incorporating the cost derived from any necessary initial investment for rendering the 
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service. This fixed cost term may be interpreted as the minimum cost necessary to keep the road 
in operation with a minimum level of quality. The variable cost terms are, in turn, a function of 
the levels of efforts ei by the agent, and where Ψi´(ei) > 0 and Ψi´´(ei) > 0. By this, we are assuming 
that the cost functions strictly increase with the efforts ei and that these cost functions are also 
strictly convex. 
Regarding remuneration, it is assumed that the agent will receive an amount from the authority 
which, in accordance with our model, depends on the quality levels qi. The remuneration is given 
by a linear equation, following the incentive schemes proposed by Holmström and Milgrom 
(1991): 
∑
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)( βα                                                                                                                      (4)            
In this expression, t is the amount paid by the authorities to the contractor and α and βi are fixed 
parameters established in the contract.  As may be seen, the agent will receive a fixed sum (given 
by the parameter α), regardless of the quality provided, together with a variable amount that 
depends on the quality verified by the authorities. Since the authorities cannot directly observe 
the efforts made by the agent, an incentive system based on the achieved quality is then 
established. However, the agent’s revenue function includes the random variables defined above 
and the greater the incentives that be established the greater the bearing of these variables. Our 
problem is then to determine the value of the α and βi parameters, established in the contract, that 
will maximise the social utility, when taking into account the trade-off between the agent’s efforts 
and their risk aversion 
When taking into account the random component of the agent’s remuneration, the expected 
value would be as follows: 
∑
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While the variance in revenue received by the agent, and specified as σt2, would be as follows: 
∑
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In addition to the social welfare function, which is defined later on, it is also necessary to consider 
the restrictions established on the basis of the agent’s utility function. This function is given by 
the following equation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993): 
2][ trCtEUr σ−−=                                                                                                                   (7)                                                                                                                                                                 
In this equation, Ur is the utility of the agent, E[t] the expected value of the payment made by the 
principal, and C the cost of producing the service. Here, r is a parameter that represents the 
agent’s attitude to risk and, when expressed in other terms, Ur would then be the certainty 
equivalent of the returns expected by the agent.  
In the case of the risk aversion of the agent, this would imply an r value strictly greater than zero, 
while in the case of risk neutrality this would suppose an r equal to zero. In our model it is 
assumed that the agent will normally be risk averse, though we shall also study the implications 
arising in the case that r = 0. We shall exclude the possibility that the agent is a risk lover, and 
therefore: 
02 ≥trσ                                                                                                                                         (8)                                                                                                                                                                 
On developing the equation (7), when considering (3) and (5), we then obtain: 
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However, in order for the agent to carry out their activity, they will have to obtain a utility 
greater or equal to the alternative of not carrying out any. If we take this latter alternative to 
represent a utility equal to zero, the agent’s participation is then dependant on the following: 
0≥Ur                                                                                                                                           (10)                                                                                                                                                                 
The social welfare function which should be maximised is thus formed by the benefits for society 
as a whole minus all costs incurred in making this service available and including, among other 
factors, the cost derived from the risk aversion of the agent. In this way, the social welfare 
function may be given by: 
][][ 2 tErCSEW ts λσ −−−=                                                                                                (11)                                                                                                                                                                 
In this equation Ws is the social welfare that is to be maximised and the variable S represents the 
social benefit given by (1), and as such: 
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Equation (11) includes the excess burden of public funds which is given by the term λE[t], where 
λ is a parameter (attributed with a value greater than zero) that characterises the tax system of the 
country in question. The value (1 + λ) is normally referred to as the marginal cost of public funds, 
a concept that incorporates various aspects, including the distortion introduced by the tax system 
in the decisions of the economic agents and the cost of tax administration. In other words, we are 
then supposing that the disutility to taxpayers inflicted by levying an additional monetary unit 
shall be equivalent to (1 + λ) monetary units, where the value of λ depends on the institutional 
framework of each country and the tax provisions used to obtain additional public funds. This 
weighting of public funds is not taken into account in the majority of cost-benefit analysis and it 
is, instead, implicitly established that λ = 0. However, Laffont and Tirole (1993) considered it 
reasonable to establish a value λ = 0.3 for the American economy and Kleven and Kreiner (2003) 
estimate λ values of between 0.09 and 0.80 for different OECD countries when considering 
proportional tax increases for the tax system as a whole. In all events, this concerns values that 
are by no means negligible. A detailed study of the concept of the marginal cost of public funds 
may be found in Dahlby (2008). 
When considering (3), (5), (6) and (12), and when substituting certain terms by their values, the 
social welfare equation may then be expressed as follows: 
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However, if we take into account equation (9), the social welfare function can then be written as: 
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When resolving the problem of maximising this function, it is necessary to take into account, in 
addition to the restriction (10), the restrictions imposed by the maximisation of the objective 
function of the agent. The agent’s efforts ei should then comply with the following first-order 
conditions: 
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That is to say: 
  iii e βψ =)´(                                                                                                                                   (15) 
The problem may then be laid out in the following terms: 
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subject to restrictions (10) and (15). 
The procedure to obtain the solution to the preceding problem is detailed in Appendix A, and the 
results can be summarized as follows: 
0=Ur                                                                                                                                          (17)                                                                                                                                                                 
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Where the maximum condition is as follows: 
0*)]´´´(*)´(2*))´´((2*)´´()[1( 222 <+++− iiiiiiiiii eerere ψψσψσψλ                              (20) 
It should be noted that in accordance with the base assumptions of the model and for a risk 
neutral or risk averse agent (that is to say, with r ≥ 0), it is sufficient that Ψ´´´(ei*) ≥ 0  in order to 
comply with the maximum condition.  
In order to simplify the exposition, while retaining the general application of the main results of 
the model, it is possible to consider a specific cost function that satisfies the condition of being 
strictly positive in its first and second derivatives and greater or equal to zero in its third 
derivative. In economic literature it is common to take the following type of quadratic cost 
functions: 
 Ψi(ei) = ki ei2/2                              
Where the parameter ki represents a constant scale factor for each effort. Examples of authors 
using quadratic cost functions include Arrow and Radner (1979), Gibbons (1998), Rob and 
Zemsky (2002), Socorro (2007) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008). 
The solution obtained with these cost functions is then as follows: 
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And from which, and when taking into account equation (17): 
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In this case the maximum condition is always observed, as Ψi´´´(ei*) = 0. 
In this way we then obtain the values of the parameters of equation (4) that optimize the contract 
in terms of social welfare. It may be noted that in an optimal contract it would generally be 
necessary to include a fixed payment α*, regardless of the quality of the service and one that 
would largely depend on the fixed cost term C0. However, the value of α* could, in theory, be 
negative which would imply the payment of a fixed sum by the agent to the principal. 
In this model the values of the parameters βi*, with a risk neutral or risk averse agent, will always 
be greater or equal to zero, as will the value of the agent’s efforts. The values of βi* (and 
subsequently the efforts made by the contractor) will be seen to drop with any increase in the risk 
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aversion of the contractor, the variance σi2 or the marginal cost of public funds. On the contrary, 
the values of βi* increase when the social benefits, represented by ai, are high.    
An important result of this model is that all the dimensions of quality that contribute a positive 
value in equation (1) should be included in the payment mechanism of the contract. As may be 
observed in equation (21), if ai> 0, then βi* will always be greater than zero. This result does not 
hold when the quality indicators are not independent, as it will be seen below. 
It may be noted that in a situation of complete information of the authorities and where these 
may directly observe the efforts made by the contractor, this would then imply that σi2 = 0 in 
equation (21). In this case the value of the contractor’s efforts would be established as: 
i
i
i
k
ae
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*
λ+
=                                                                                                                               (23) 
When the contractor is risk averse, this value will always be higher than that obtained under the 
assumption of asymmetric information between principal and agent. However, when the 
contractor is risk neutral (r=0), the result obtained will always be as that given by equation (23). 
3. Redundant performance indicators 
In the previous section we assumed that the performance indicators employed are independent 
of each other. However, in practice, there is often a correlation between two or more indicators. 
In this section we shall tackle this question, though for reasons of simplicity the analysis shall be 
restricted to the case where it is taken that the agent will make an effort “e” that will only have an 
effect on two interrelated performance indicators. At the same time, each indicator is only 
affected by this sole effort e.  
In this way, we would then obtain: 
11 e+= eq                                                                                                                                    (24) 
22 e+= eq                                                                                                                                   (25) 
Where q1 and q2 represent the levels obtained in indicators 1 and 2 respectively, e the level of 
effort made by the contractor and ε1 and ε2 are random variables with distributions N(0, σ1) and 
N(0, σ2) respectively. These random variables are taken to be positively correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient ρ (ρ ≥ 0), and we will assume that σ2 > σ1. 
We can assume that the expected social benefit would be given by the following equation, in 
accordance with the notation employed above:
 
aeSSE o +=][                                                                                                                             (26) 
The cost incurred by the contractor, when taking a variable cost  Ψ(e) = ke2/2 , would be given 
by:
 
/220 keCC +=                                                                                                                           (27) 
The contractor’s remuneration would be given by:                             
22112,1 )( qqqqt ββα ++=                                                                                                   (28) 
Where α, β1 and β2 are the contract parameters to be optimized. By way of restriction, it is 
assumed that performance incentives are null or positive, that is to say, β1 ≥ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. 
The expected remuneration of the contractor is then: 
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While the variance in the remuneration t would, in this case, be given by: 
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Or when expressed differently: 
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Where ρ is the correlation coefficient between both indicators. 
The contractor’s utility function, where we assume risk aversion (r > 0), would once again be 
given by: 
2][ trCtEUr σ−−=                                                                                                                (31)                                                                                                                                                                 
On developing this equation, we then obtain: 
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And where the restrictions imposed by the contractor’s utility function would now be: 
0≥Ur                                                                                                                                           (33)                                                                                                                                                                 
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The social welfare function to be maximized is now as follows: 
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And where the problem is subsequently reduced to: 
}{Ws)2,1,,( ββeUrMax                                                                                                                     (36) 
Subject to restrictions (33) and (34). 
This problem can be solved following a similar procedure as the one detailed in Appendix A. 
Then, the first order conditions are as follows: 
0=Ur                                                                                                                                          (37)                                                                                                                                                
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It may be verified that for variance values and a correlation coefficient that meet: 
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12 σρσ ≥                                                                                                                                     (42) 
then the following values of the parameters will meet the previous first order conditions and 
optimize the social welfare function: 
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With: 
k
e ** 1β=                                                                                                                                      (45)  
As such, if the correlation coefficient is high and the variance associated with indicator 2 is 
significantly higher than that with indicator 1, one may then obtain an internal solution for 
parameter β1 and a corner solution for parameter β2. Thus the optimal solution is obtained by 
eliminating the performance indicator showing the greatest variance from the performance 
indicator system. In the event of low correlation coefficient values (ρ) it is then not possible to 
guarantee that this is the optimal solution and it may well be preferable to retain both indicators. 
4. Analysis of the indicators employed in Spanish road concessions 
The results obtained in equation (21) above have an interesting implication. As may be seen, the 
efforts made by the agent under an optimal contract depend on certain factors related to the 
general economic environment, such as risk aversion and the marginal cost of public funds. 
However, this also depends on a factor, the variance σi2, which in turn depends on the correct 
design of the quality indicators employed in the contract. In this respect, the selected indicators 
should not have, as much as possible, any considerable disparity between the efforts made by the 
contractor and the quality level measured according to the corresponding indicator.  
When taking these results as the starting point it is possible to compare the theoretical criteria 
defining an optimal contract with the real application of quality indicators. To this effect, we shall 
employ examples of road concessions in Spain, taken from the work by Delgado Quiralte et al. 
(2007). In the majority of road concessions put out to contract in Spain since 2002 (from the time 
of the draft bill on Concession Law that was finally passed in May 2003), different quality 
indicators have been applied that partly determine the remuneration of the contractor, though in 
the majority of cases these have been combined with other payment mechanisms based on the 
number of users. Appendix B includes all the concessions considered in this study with an 
outline of some of the characteristics of these concessions. This includes a group of 25 road 
concessions put out to tender from 2002, all of which include performance indicator systems that 
affect, to a greater or lesser extent, the payment to the concessionaire. 
The performance indicators employed vary from one concession to another. Some of these 
contain a very large number of indicators and for this reason table 1 only includes the most 
significant and more widely used indicators. The table includes a definition of each indicator and 
an ensuing appraisal (“high”, “medium” or “low”) of the dispersion between the possible result 
obtained for the indicator and the efforts made by the concessionaire to reach this result. The sole 
purpose of this exercise is to establish up to what extent the design of the performance indicator 
system follows the theoretical criteria of efficiency analyzed in this article. The majority of the 
concessions referred to have only been in operation for a short time and we subsequently do not 
have the necessary information to compare the quality levels that have really been obtained in the 
different concessions. 
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Table 1. Use of performance indicators in Spanish road concessions 
Performance 
indicator 
Definition of indicator Assessment of 
dispersion 
between result 
and effort 
No. of concessions 
where the indicator 
is applied 
Road accidents Accident  index = No. of accidents with victims 
per year/Lx ADTx365 (L = length of road section; 
ADT= Average Daily Traffic) 
High 25 
Road fatalities Fatality index = No. of fatalities in road accidents 
per year/LxADTx365 
High 24 
Congestion Congestion index = No. of weighted hours per 
year in which the service level is E or F 
High 20 
Skid resistance Sideways force coefficient (SFC) Low 20 
Longitudinal  road 
smoothness 
International Roughness Index (IRI)  Low 20 
Road capacity 
availability 
Application of deduction in the case of closure by 
the concessionaire of one or more lanes of the 
roadway 
Medium 16 
State of road 
markings 
Rate of retroreflection of road markings Low 11 
State of road signs  Replacement response time Low 11 
Cleaning of 
roadway and 
verges 
Correction response time Low 11 
Accident and 
incident response 
Response time to incidents, signalling and repairs 
and replacements 
Low 10 
 
As may be seen, some of the most widely used indicators are those that tend to show a greater 
variation between the result effectively obtained and the effort made by the concessionaire to 
improve this quality aspect. This is particularly the case of the road accident and fatality indices 
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that are employed in practically all the concessions that have been studied and which are also 
used in road management contracts in other countries (Rangel et al., 2012, 2013).  
5. Conclusions 
As a result of the analysis conducted in this work, an incentive mechanism in road management 
should include both a fixed payment to the contractor and a set of payments established in 
accordance with the quality levels obtained. The optimal weights of quality indicators, together 
with the efforts made by the contractor, decrease with any increase in risk aversion, the σi2 
variance or the marginal cost of public funds.  
The range of performance indicators employed in the contract should be as wide as possible and 
attempt to include all the quality dimensions that significantly influence the social welfare 
function. In this respect, it is to be expected that the agent will focus all their efforts on those 
quality dimensions that are specifically regulated, but there would be a high risk that certain 
quality aspects would be neglected merely on account of being omitted from the contract.  
However, reference should be made to the results obtained in the present study regarding the 
selection of performance indicators. As may be seen in equation (21) above, the effort made by 
the agent under an optimal contract depends on a factor, the variance σi2, which in turn depends 
on the correct design of the quality indicators employed in the contract. In this respect, the 
selected indicators should not have any considerable disparity between the efforts made by the 
contractor and the quality level measured according to the corresponding indicator. As such, all 
those indicators providing results with a high random component beyond the control of the 
contractor should not be overweighted. 
Furthermore, the results of this work show that when there is a high correlation between two 
performance indicators, the optimal solution consists of a contractor retribution system that only 
employs the indicator whose random component shows the smallest variance.  
These results are in line with the informativeness principle of contract theory mentioned in the 
introduction. An operative rule to apply this principle to the design of road management 
contracts could be the following, according to the results obtained in this work: the set of 
indicators should cover all the relevant dimensions of quality, but each kind of effort should be 
estimated only by one quality indicator (the one with the lowest variance), if the correlation 
between different indicators is high.   
In practice, some of the most widely used indicators tend to show a great variation between the 
result effectively obtained and the effort made by the concessionaire to improve this quality 
aspect. This is particularly the case of the road accident and fatality indices that are employed in 
many road Public-Private Partnerships (Delgado Quiralte et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2012). The 
results obtained from these indicators effectively depend on numerous random factors and only 
to a certain degree on the performance of the contractor. In addition, indicators such as the 
accident rate generally show a high correlation with indicators related to the correct maintenance 
of the different elements of the road (Wallman and Aström, 2001). Therefore, according to the 
model developed in this work, it would be ineffective to establish the contractor's payment 
mainly on these types of indicators such as the accident index, since this greatly reduces the 
social welfare on account of the risk aversion of the agent. 
The reason behind the generalized use of these types of indicators related to road accidents is that 
of the large social repercussions of these accidents. The introduction of accident and fatality 
indices among the quality indicators of a road management contract may transmit the idea of a 
public concern for traffic safety, but these are not necessarily the most efficient indicators. The 
results of this work may serve to revaluate the loss of efficiency resulting from the selection of 
quality indicators that generally tend to give random results and show that it is preferable to 
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employ other indicators (related, for example, to road maintenance, signs and markings or 
response to incidents) that also affect safety but whose results depend more on the performance 
of the contractor. 
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Appendix A. Solution of the optimization problem  
Starting from equation (16), it may be observed that this social welfare function monotonically  
decreases with Ur, because it is assumed that λ > 0. A positive value of λ is crucial to guarantee 
the existence of a unique solution to this problem.  
Thus the value of the variable Ur that maximizes the social welfare function will be the minimum 
compatible with restriction (10), i.e., Ur* = 0. Additionally, if we introduce the restriction (15) into 
the expression (16), the problem is then reduced to:  
 })({f)( iei eMax                                      
Where the function f(ei) is the following:      
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The first order conditions are the following:      
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Starting from equation (47) we can obtain the critical points ei*. Taking into account equation (15), 
we can then obtain the parameters βi* that optimize the contract: 
*)´(* iii eψβ =                                                                                                                               (48) 
The critical points will represent a maximum for the function f if the Hessian matrix H(f) is 
negative definite. In this case, the Hessian matrix is diagonal, so the maximum condition will be: 
,0*)( 2
2
<
∂
∂
i
i
e
ef
  for any i                                                                                                       (49)  
That is: 
0*)]´´´(*)´(2*))´´((2*)´´()[1( 222 <+++− iiiiiiiiii eerere ψψσψσψλ                              (50) 
It may be observed that, under the assumption of a risk neutral or risk averse agent (that is to say, 
with r ≥ 0), then it is sufficient that Ψ´´´(ei*) ≥ 0 in order to comply with the maximum condition 
(50). 
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Appendix B. Concessions examined 
Concession Type (Greenfield/ 
Brownfield) 
Length of 
section or 
network (km) 
Payment system to 
the concessionaire 
Year of 
procurement 
M-12 Airport access (Madrid) Greenfield 9 Real tolls/quality 
indicators  
2002 
AP-7 Cartagena-Vera Motorway Greenfield 114 Real tolls/quality 
indicators 
2003 
AP-36 Ocaña-La Roda Motorway Greenfield 148 Real tolls/quality 
indicators 
2003 
AP-41 Madrid-Toledo Motorway Greenfield 60 Real tolls/quality 
indicators 
2003 
AP-7 Alicante Ring-road Greenfield 28.5 Real tolls/quality 
indicators 
2003 
AP-46 Málaga-Las Pedrizas Motorway Greenfield 24.5 Real tolls/quality 
indicators 
2005 
A-1 Santo Tomé del Puerto-Burgos Brownfield 146 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-2 Madrid-R2 Brownfield 57 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-2 km. 62- Guadalajara/Soria 
provincial boundary 
Brownfield 76 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-2 Guadalajara/Soria provincial 
boundary-Calatayud 
Brownfield 95 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-2 Calatayud-Alfajarín Brownfield 107 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-3 Madrid/Cuenca provincial 
boundary - Cuenca/Albacete provincial 
boundary 
Brownfield 141 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
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A-3 La Roda-Bonete Brownfield 94 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-3 Bonete-Alicante Brownfield 111 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-4 Madrid-R4 Brownfield 65 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
A-4 Puerto Lápice-Venta de Cárdenas Brownfield 107 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2007 
AG-11 Barbanza Motorway Greenfield 42 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2005 
AG-56 Santiago-Brión Motorway Greenfield 15 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2004 
AG-41 Salnés Motorway Greenfield 17 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2004 
MA-15 Palma-Manacor Motorway Greenfield 41 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2004 
M-203 Motorway (Madrid) Greenfield 18 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2005 
M-407 Motorway (Madrid) Greenfield 11.5 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2005 
CV-35 Motorway Valencia-Losa del 
Obispo 
Greenfield 54 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2004 
Cuenca Provincial Council network Brownfield 950 Shadow tolling/quality 
indicators 
2006 
Toledo Provincial Council network Brownfield 989 Quality indicators 2006 
 
